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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
lnJnrooD

LAND CO~f PANY,

·i 11n 1·tTw rt:h i p,
<I

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
Case No.
10911

l",\f:TIELL W. KL\lBA LL and
1

:Ill\~.

FARRELL ,Y. KIMBALL

DPf Pndants,

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NTATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Action to quiet title, and for title disparagement
rlamagl't:, in which sheriff's return on summons served
un dt>f\ ndant-ap1wllant was made out of time.
0

1HSPOSITTON TN

LO\VI~R

COURT

Court entered its order denying defendantaii111·llm1t':;; motion to quash summons filed with an out
r 11m1· rPtnrn.
Di~trid

'

1

RELIEF SOUOH'r ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant, l\Irs. Farrell

·w. Kirnhall, sePk

(a) reversal of said order dPnying the quashing of
purported service of summons, or (b) Pnfr:· of an

~airi

n 1i),.,

affirming her motion to quash.

Plaintiff-respondent's summons (R. (i) \ms pmportedly serveJ ( R. 7) on defrnJant-appellant on Fehntary 7, 1967, at Sacramento County, California (in !tPn
of publication of summons). Contrary to requin•rnt·ntf
of Rule -Hg), Ftah Rules of Civil ProcedurP, proof of
service was made on F'ehruary 15, 19G7, (R. 7, H.11)
more than five clays after its purportPcl st•rvi<'<'. Ilefendant-Appt>llant, appearing spt•cially, filed her

111 11-

tion (among otlwr things) to quash said se>rvi!·r and
summons (R. 1)

bt.~cause

of said dPfeet in

tlu~ return.

Denial of sai(l motion to quash was Pntl'rPd (R 2, :i) !ii
District Court. The>reaftt>r, and within tinw Jimifr<l for
taking ap1wab, dPfrnclant-appellant's petition for 1tn
intermc->cliate ap1wal (R. 8-11) was filed, and !Pa\•''''
pros(•c·ut<> said inknnecliatp ap1wal (R. +) Jiaying li 1•1:
granted hy this llonorahl!• court, appPIJant's hriPf lwrei 11
is filed.

3

POINT 1.
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MAKING
~.\ID

ORDER TN THAT CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS

OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND PAR-

TJCllLARLY RULE 4(g) WHICH REQUIRES UNDER HEAD-

JYG "i\IANNER OF PROOF" THAT A RETURN BE MADE

\OTIIIN "FIVE" DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF PROCESS, IT
HELD RETURN l\IADE OUT OF TIME VALID.
POINT 2.
THAT CONTRARY TO THE UT AH RULES OF CIVIL
PROC'EDl'TIE AND PARTICULARLY RULE 4(g), THE DISHUlT COURT HELD THAT A RETURN MADE OUT OF

TL\IE WAS AS ACCEPTABLE AS IF MADE WITHIN THE
RSQUIRED PERIOD.

l'1'A1I RP:LES OF' CJYTL PROCEDURE, RULE
Hl!:) r('<1nin•s:

:) da:rn aft<>r service of process, proof
tl1PrPof shrtll lie made as follo\\·s: . . . " (Italics
on rs)
~Within

Tl1<~ rdnrn or proof of serviee of the summons pur-

l' it·t 1·dl.\· s<'JT<'d hen•in (H. 7, 11) was made more than

dn»s aftc'l' survie<', and f'ontrary to tliP rule above>
!il11( I'(I.

4

The simple question herein involved is whethl·r th"
rule as set forth means what it says when it reqnirr;
proof within said period of time. The intent of the rule,
in making such a requirement had, no doubt, some
tory purpose. Discussion of Utah Hult>s of CiYi! P111
cedure (Vol. XX, Utah Bar Bulletin, Page 9) oni•
reitf•rates the rule itself.
Normally, in the context of language used, the word
"shall" imports an imperative or mandatory requir'ment, and it is on this that appellant takes excrption tr:
the lower Court's ruling that this requirement is otl1Pr\Vise. (See Black's Law Dictionar>T, +th Edition, PagP'
54--55, wlwrPin it is statPd:
"As used in statutes, contracts, or tlw like.
this word is generally imperative or mandaton
. . . " [Its use as permissive, is only "whrre no
right or benefit to any onp depends on its being
taken in the impt•rative sense, and where n11
public or private right is impairPd h!' its inti·rpretation in the other sPnse."J
"Sec. 28 Terminology: The intention ... a'
to the mandatorv or directory nature of a particular . . . pr;vision is detenuincd primanlr
from the lanl!llage thcn•of. v\T ords or phra> 1 :~
which are gen~rally regarded as making a pr1;': 1·
· n1an d atorv, me
· IlHI<' ' s h a II' . . . " ,,r::o ,'1..•
A J· ~tas1on
tutes, Page 50.
. i·mg t I ia t a <.·ty
"~lwli
"Thus, a statute provH
1 . _ •.
. t.ion . . . , creat c• a f un cl . · · 1s Jill
hv appropna
p~rativP not onl!· in form, hnt also in efft-d, ani1

1

I

l

does not invest the city with any discretion" DPseret Savings Bank vs. Francis (1923), 62 Utah
85, 217 P. 1114, 103 A.L.R. 814, 135 A.L.R. 1294.
Accord, State vs. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, (pages
;33 & :H), 80 Pac. 865.
if the return, as made, and being out of time is
ddl'tt>ll upon being quashed, as it should be, there re!llain:-; nothing to support any alleged service of sumwons, and, there being no proof of service as required,
(and appellant-defendant having appeared specially for
the puqwses of the motion to quash), there is nothing
in tlw record to bring this defendant-appellant within
the jurisdiction of the District Court, and therefore the
,-;nmmons has no basis upon which to stand and should
he quaslwd.
~o.

Language in Federal Land Bank vs. Brinton, et al.,
JUG rtah 149, HG Pac.2d 200, is particularly pertinent
hen·, although the facts of the case are not those of the
inRtant <'as0:

"Good practice would always commend adequate service and prompt filing of the return ... "
(Page 154, Utah)
And, our rule, in keeping with this admonition was no
rlouht so worded and intended, with good reason.
POINT 3.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING THE
TERMS OF RULE 4(g) FULL AND PROPER EFFECT.

6
Aside from the contention that the language• or
rule should lw taken at its mandatory uspeet, tltPri 1,.
1

:"

mains tlw furthPr qnestion, as to 1n·o(·ppcfo1gs, in ~i·n 111 •
upon a non-resident of Ftah.
(a)

Personal serv1('(' outsille the StatP of rtaJ,

was intended as equivak,nt to and in lieu of rmhlicatin 11
of summons, and, such a 1n·oc·<'<:>ding, being in dProgat: 011

of common law, strict construdion of statutes rdating
to such procE>dnrPs has heun required hy tl1<· anthontiP.'.
in ordPr to makP a valid service. For PXampl<o, it ha'
hPPn statPd:

.. rl11w right to serve prncess 11:; pnhlication he.
ing of pm·<·l:· statutor:· Cl'Pation and in d1>rogati1111
of common law, the statntP authorizing sueh Sf'1·1.
ice rnnst /Je strictly p11rsucd, in order to confn

jnrisdidion upon the Court." (Empliasi::; add~di.
'J'hornpson vs. Rohhins, 32 \Yashingion J.rn. i2
Pac. 10-1:3.

To the same effect se« footnotP in :10 Corpn:-: Jmi>.

563, Sec. 2G-t, which reads in rP1<->vant part:
"F'ootnntP 21 . . . . all 110kling that a return
sho\\·ing eonstnwtiv(' sPJTice is to lw strictly rnn
strned.''
The only qnPstion lwn• is 1d1dlH'l' SH·tion GS-3·~
Utah Code A nnotatPd 19;):~, whieh n'laxes th<' corn 1111111
law rulP 01· HnlP 1 (a) ('.H.C.P .. in statuton· <'Oll~tnwtinn
is to h<' appli<«l to tli(• C'Onstnwtion of this rnk, i.('.,

1
'
1

tliP rnl<' to lw (.'<prn1Pcl to nml !!;iY<'ll tlw s:\11!<' for1· 1• 11 ~ '

r
7

,rntnl•': 1f not, then, of course the above authorities
11 unld

apply.

(h) 'rhere has heen considerable development in
the rnnstitutional law of permitting non-residents to be
,,.rw1l \\'ith process outside of a state, and made answernl1lr to tlw actions commenced against them in states
ntlirr than that of residence of a defendant, but, such
~tatntes an~ all subject to the incidents and requirements
uf "dnC'" Jirocess. Examples of such proceedings arc•
found in following cases:
"Conn YH. ·Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 Pac.
~d 871 and \\rein vs. Crockett, 113 Utah 301 (306),
I!Ji) PaC'. 222."
\Yhilt- none of these cases discuss the procedural
point involvPd here, it is nonetheless a corollary that
dnP proet>ss requirements would apply equally to proMlHral as to C'onstitutional grounds.
(c) Now for a moment, let ns assume that the rule
of driet <'ompliancc> with rule is not required, as the
lom"r Court's ruling ·would seem to indicate, and see
1dwl rPsnlt attends. ThP rule (Utah Rules Civil Procerlnn· --l-(1.;)) requin•s making of return within five days.
liii~ is din•ctl~, eontrary, and a complete change from
lhv FP(k•ral HnlPs (particularly Rule 4(g) Federal Rules

Prnrwhir<>). :-;o it:-; interninwnt must thPrefore be in-

8
tended as a change from the federal procedure. Noir, 11
we do not hold the rule to be mandatory, or of effeel, cir
of any importance, what result~ The result in essenee
would be that the requirement of the rnle is entinh
emasculated, or cancelled out, as there would he n~
period, as now required, left for the performanct' of thi<
act; and the reason for its inclusion in the rules, anrl th1,
safeguards that would be lost if the process server tried
to recall the facts of service after greater passagp of
time would he suhvNtecl.
All rules of statutory or rule construction point to.
'''ard a sensihle result. Should the time element Iirniterl
in the rule he read out - then' would he no point to thr•
wording of the rule - and an utterly unintended and
wholly different result reaclwd.
CON CL lTSION

For the reasons above: (a) Necessity for Mandatory construction of the wording of the rule, (b) 'rhe
requirement of sensibility in interpretation, (c) Tlw
necessity for adherence to due process, to give rule viability are thP only valid conclusions.
\VHEREFORE, the defendant-appellant prays: 1ll
That this Honorable Court reverse the ruling of th"
order of trial Court, as to the denial of her motion tn
quash thP f'\ummons, or in tlw altPrnativP (2) 'rlud lhis

9

!Iunurable Court enter ruling on the motion in favor of
defrndant-appellant, or (3) That this Court make its
~11 rnrd of costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS,
R. S. JOHNSON,
Attorneys for AppellantDefendant, Mrs. Farrell W.
Kimball.
Service of two copies of the foregoing brief of appellants

aeknowledged this ________ day of July, A.D. 1967.

(REED H. RJICHARDS)
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

